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Introduction
The national telecommunications sectors have in the past operated as natural monopolies. State-owned carriers were in charge of maintaining and providing access to the national copper-based fixed telephone network. 1 The industry landscape began changing in the 1990s, when mobile telephony became widespread due to the deployment of GSM technology. In the same period, fixed network incumbents began providing Internet services through the existing copper-based infrastructure. In one of the first liberalization attempts, the US Telecommunications Act of 1996 imposed access obligations on incumbent carriers to allow for network interconnection. The EU followed suit in 1998. at the end of 2013, more than 97% of all EU homes had access to fixed broadband, 62% of which were covered by ultra-fast broadband (European Commission, 2014a). The deployment and uptake of (ultra-)fast broadband provided an impetus for the expansion of VoIP telephony as its quality critically depends on the underlying connection speed. 2 If an emerging communications service such as VoIP becomes a substitute for the existing ones, the competitive boundaries might shift, which has to be considered in the regulatory decision-making.
The European Commission's 'Recommendation on relevant product and service markets 1 The term fixed telephone network is equivalent to Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS). It refers to the international telephone system based on copper wires carrying voice data in the form of analog waves. Fixed telephony includes markets for access, call origination, and call termination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location.
2 VoIP, or broadly Internet telephony, is a methodology and a group of technologies that enables the usage of the Internet as the transmission medium for telephone calls. This type of telephony is digital, i.e., voice signals are translated into binary data instead of analog waves. The data packets are then transmitted via Internet Protocol (IP). VoIP can be unmanaged and managed. Unmanaged VoIP (also pure VoIP service, i.e., a peer-to-peer application) is based on a software developed by independent content providers and is not regulated. Typical examples include Skype and Viber. From the demand side, managed VoIP is nearly equivalent to the traditional fixed telephony. Consumers make and receive calls using a telephone gadget and are assigned a geographic or non-geographic number. Termination rates for calls to and from managed VoIP are regulated.
within the electronic communications sectors' has recently suggested that ex ante access obligations from the markets for access (market 1/2007) and call origination (2/2007) on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location can be removed. 3 While the decision to discontinue the regulation was in the past based on meeting the Three test criteria, national regulators are nowadays obliged to provide evidence that a market has failed the test in order to retain the regulation. The burden of proof has thus been reversed. 4 The decision to deregulate is, inter alia, based on the degree of substitution between fixed-lines and other telephone services (European Commission, 2014c; FICORA, 2013). The Commission underlines that, although both mobiles and VoIP constrain the fixed incumbent carriers, only managed VoIP is a proper substitute for fixed-lines. This conclusion is based on the differences in features, contracts, and consumption patterns between mobile and fixed-line telephony.
Surprisingly, the empirical literature is almost silent with regard to VoIP telephony and its relationship to other communications services. Few existing studies on VoIP examine the traffic substitution and deal almost exclusively with unmanaged VoIP, i.e., peer-to-peer applications. However, analyzing managed VoIP, which is regarded as a possible substitute for a fixed-line due to its similarities from the demand side, is critical in the light of changed market conditions and the necessity to redesign the existing regulatory framework. To the best of our knowledge, a coherent analysis of the access substitutability between fixed-line, mobile and managed VoIP telephony has been absent from the literature. Our paper attempts to bridge this research gap. We address the following questions: (a) what is the extent of access substitution between fixed-lines and managed VoIP? (b) and how is the demand for fixed-lines and managed VoIP affected by mobiles? We focus on access instead of traffic substitution because the former is more relevant from the regulatory perspective and there is a lack of any empirical evidence on this issue.
We employ a half-yearly dataset for 20 EU countries spanning the 2008-2011 period and apply dynamic panel data methods. Our main interest is the estimation of own-and cross-price elasticities between fixed-lines, mobiles, and managed VoIP, which are indicative of the possibility of market power abuse. 5 Our results indicate a strong access substitution between fixed-lines and mobiles and provide vague evidence of their substitution with managed VoIP at the EU level. Second, bundling strategies are essential for maintaining the subscription base in the market for fixed-lines. Contrary to the Commission's appraisal, our findings suggest that fixed-lines and mobiles likely constitute part of the same market. Overall, we find evidence in favor of access substitution and, therefore, of joint market definition. Ex ante access obligations imposed on copper-based incumbents might therefore be redundant. However, in the short-run, national regulators might need to consider targeted remedies in order to protect the captive group. In this case, the regulatory framework must be redesigned in a way that is conducive to competition and innovation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the relevant literature.
Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy and describes our dataset. The results are presented in Section 4, before the discussion on policy implications in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. . This pertains primarily to the captive users, who cannot disconnect from the fixed-lines due to the lack of alternatives. The reasons for the captivity are twofold. First, fixed-lines provide access to services which are not compatible with either VoIP or mobiles, including fax, alarm systems, remote maintenance and monitoring applications. Second, for technical reasons, legacy copper-based equipment cannot always be operated by IP solutions, which creates high switching costs (BEREC, 2014, p.16). Overall, the literature provides convincing evidence of fixed-mobile substitution on both an access and traffic level, while the evidence on traffic substitution between VoIP and other communications services is inconclusive. The latter is partly due to the relatively old datasets and short time-series. Against this backdrop, our study is the first to investigate the access substitution between VoIP and other communications technologies.
Literature review
We employ a recent dataset and set up a coherent framework for the analysis of the substitution between fixed-lines, mobiles, and managed VoIP. (1970), we capture the demand persistence using the lagged values of the subscription levels. We further assume that the subscripit, followed by MSN (18%), BT/Yahoo! (16%), Tesco (6%), plus Orange (Wanadoo) and Google (both 4%).
7 Note that the validity of the instruments included in this study is debatable if the contract length exceeds one month. tion volumes are driven by both current and lagged prices, since the cancellation and subscription decisions might not be immediate. We specify the demand function for technology K = {fix, mob, voip} in period t as:
where k ∈ K denotes fixed, mobile or managed VoIP telephony, k sub is the demand for k measured in terms of the subscription base, p k is the price of service k,
is the price vector of all potential substitutes of k, and X t is a vector of demand shifters which includes the number of broadband connections, the number of fixed incumbents' subscribers in the mobile market, and the monthly income per capita.
Making use of the panel structure of our dataset, we define the demand for service k in country i at time t as:
where η i represents the time-constant country fixed-effect and ν it is an unobservable error term.
Considering that all contracts begin at different points in time and that contractual durations vary, we include the first lag of the dependent variable to capture the average demand persistence. Including a maximum of one lag is a compromise due to the degrees of freedom considerations. According to the economic theory of a downward sloping demand curve, the effect of own price on demand is predicted to be negative.
Concerning the prices of other services, a positive coefficient indicates substitutability, while a negative one is indicative of a complementary relationship. The impact of fixed broadband is expected to differ across technologies. First, Grzybowski and Verboven (2016) show that more broadband connections lead to complementarities between fixed and mobile telephony, due to incumbent carriers' ability to leverage their dominant position in the fixed-line network into the mobile market. Second, high-speed broadband ensures a higher quality voice service, thereby providing an impetus for VoIP adoption.
Additional bundling strategies and the strategic behavior of fixed-line incumbents are controlled for by accounting for their subscription base in the mobile market. 8 Carriers of substitutes are potentially endogenous, too (cf. Caves, 2011) . In order to address the endogeneity, we apply an instrumental variable approach. We employ two sets of instruments: (i) lagged levels for lagged dependent and price variables (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and (ii) cost shifters for price variables. The latter group of instruments are valid because costs have no direct impact on subscription decisions, but influence the endogenous price variables. We use the termination rates as cost shifters, as they are directly incorporated into the calling prices and are the only observable cost shifters (cf. Barth and Heimeshoff, 2014a) . Moreover, termination rates are set by the national regulators and are kept constant until the European Commission approves changes after a new round of regulation. Hence, they can be considered exogenous. In line with Briglauer et al. (2011), we include both fixed-to-fixed and fixed-to-mobile termination rates. Since the regulatory changes are likely to affect prices with some delay, we employ their lagged, instead of current, values.
In order to avoid spurious correlations, we test for the presence of a stochastic trend in each variable. The results of the panel unit root test are presented in Table A3 . Fixedline and mobile subscriptions are stationary in levels and in differences, whereas VoIP subscription is stationary in differences only. Since the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator is based on differences, our specification does not suffer from spurious correlation problem. Cointegration, i.e., long-term relationship between the variables, cannot be present either, given that the dependent and explanatory variables are integrated of different orders (Hamilton, 1994) . Table A5 provides a detailed description of our dataset.
Data
9 All countries included in this study are listed in Table A4 in the Appendix.
9
The regression variables are defined as follows. Fixed-line demand represents the number of active analogue circuit-switched retail subscribers, measured as the number of active channels. Mobile demand is defined as the number of active individual mobile connections, including both pre-paid and post-paid users. Managed VoIP demand refers to the number of active channels of either paid-for native VoIP services that use a broadband access connection or VoIP services included in a paid-for bundle with broadband access. Thus, peer-to-peer applications are excluded. The fixed-line price is expressed as the sum of the access fee and calling price, both calculated as the average revenues per line. As is common in other studies, we proxy for the price of mobile telephony by the average revenue per user (cf., e.g., Ward and Zheng, 2012) . The price of VoIP is calculated as the unweighted average price of all double-play contracts, which include both a broadband and a managed VoIP connection. The measure of the average VoIP price might therefore slightly overestimate the actual VoIP price.
In our regression equations, each variable is expressed in logarithms in order to be interpreted as elasticity. The price-related variables are measured in euros and deflated using the CPI with the year 2005 as the base period. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 and the correlation matrix between the variables in Table A6 . 4 Empirical results
Main results
The Arellano-Bond GMM estimator is sensitive to the lag structure (e.g., Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Therefore, we estimate two models with different sets of instruments. In Model A, we include the fourth lags of the subscription levels and prices. As our dataset is of half-yearly frequency and some contracts have a 24-months duration, this specification should not suffer from the endogeneity problem. Considering that most contracts are shorter than 24 months, Model B employs the second and the third lag of the dependent variable and the second lag of price variables as instruments. 10
Estimation results from our baseline specification are presented in Table 2 .
Due to the first-difference transformation of the GMM estimator, the residuals have a Our pricing data shows that, on average, 82% of all double-play offers with fixed-lines and broadband have a contract length up to 18 months and 72% up to 12 months. Concerning the double-play offers consisting of VoIP and broadband, 79% of contracts are up to 18 months long, while 72% are up to 12 months long. Concerning the mobile market, around 50% of subscribers use the prepaid services with no contractual obligations.
11 Given that we apply an equation-by-equation estimation, the fixed-line and VoIP estimation are unaffected by this potential inconsistency in the mobile telephony equation. Note further that the estimation results also hold if only the third lag is included. Hence, the bias is probably small. implying substitution from fixed-lines to mobiles. This result is in line with the existing literature and with the overall trends in telecommunications markets, which indicate an increasing importance of mobiles at the expense of fixed telephony. Surprisingly, the impact of VoIP prices on the demand for fixed-lines is insignificant at the aggregate EU level. Managed VoIP might nonetheless restrict the fixed-line carriers with the threat of potential market entry. This threat is credible due to an increasing availability of (ultra-)fast broadband, which fosters the transition from copper-to IP-based networks.
We find a positive and significant effect of the number of fixed incumbents' subscribers in the mobile market. The ability to offer bundles constitutes an important factor in maintaining the subscription base and, ultimately, in slowing down the decay of fixed telephony. The number of broadband lines and monthly income per capita are insignificant. The former might be due to the declining market shares of copper incumbents in the broadband market, while the latter indicates that the demand for fixed-lines is primarily determined by the development of a fixed-network infrastructure.
The results of mobile demand estimation are presented in columns (2) 
Robustness checks
We assess the robustness of our results by employing two additional specifications. 12
The lag structure in both robustness checks is equivalent to Model A, since the corre- Given that the coverage and quality of fixed-line networks in developed and more densely populated countries tend to be more advanced, while the usage of telecommunications services is likely more intensive, both specifications include GDP per capita and population density (cf., e.g., Caves, 2011; Barth and Heimeshoff, 2014a). The results of the robustness checks are presented in Table A7 .
Both specifications confirm our main results. We document path dependencies in the subscription patterns for each telephony service and a strong substitution from fixedlines to mobiles. Again, fixed-mobile substitution is weakened by bundling strategies:
the presence of fixed-line carriers in the mobile market and/or increased number of incumbents' DSL subscribers in the broadband market help maintain the fixed-line subscription base. The results also confirm the complementarity between mobile and VoIP telephony, as well as the positive relationship between income and the adoption of mobiles. The current own-price elasticity of VoIP demand is significant. However, the same does not hold for cross-price elasticities.
Policy implications and discussion
The key advantage of our estimation approach is the possibility to disentangle shortand long-run elasticities. 13 Table 3 . This is likely due to the structure of our dataset, which spans a relatively recent period and enables us to capture "the latest and arguably most dramatic developments" in the telecommunications sector (Vogelsang, 2010, p.14). However, considering the differences in competitive conditions across the member states, this issue must be addressed by each national regulatory authority separately.
Another relevant issue for future regulation is the role of unmanaged VoIP. Most national regulators do not consider this service to be a substitute for managed VoIP, which is due to differences in features and consumption patterns. However, an increased usage of 
Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the degree of access substitution between fixed, mobile, and managed VoIP telephony. Our study is the first to investigate the interdependencies between all three types of voice services in a coherent cross-country framework. We use a sample of 20 EU countries in 2008-2011 and apply dynamic panel data techniques to estimate the own-and the cross-price elasticities. Due to the endogeneity of the lagged subscription base and price variables, we apply an instrumental variable approach.
We document strong access substitution between fixed-lines and mobiles and find weak support for the long-run substitution from fixed-lines to managed VoIP telephony. Hence, both telephone services likely constrain the market power of fixed incumbent carriers.
On the other hand, bundling raises the demand for fixed-lines. While the substitutability indicates that ex ante access obligations imposed on fixed incumbents might be redundant, bundling strategies as a source of market power hint at their necessity. At the EU level, we find evidence in favor of joint market definition and, therefore, of discontinuing the regulation. However, due to different competitive environments across the member states, this issue must be addressed by the individual national regulators. Thus, the question of whether the threat of market power abuse by the fixed incumbents still exists is not answered conclusively. Targeted access obligations might be one of the solutions to protect the captive group of consumers and ensure a level playing field for all operators active in the market. In this case, national regulators must redesign the regulatory frameworks in a way that does not stifle competition and innovation.
In its explanatory note on the deregulation of markets for access and call origination on the public fixed network, the European Commission underlines that (managed) VoIP, and not mobile, is a proper substitute for fixed-lines. Our results, in contrast, suggest a stronger substitutability between fixed-lines and mobiles than between fixed-lines and VoIP telephony. Given its forward-looking perspective, the Commission anticipates that fixed-lines and VoIP will become effective substitutes within the validity period of the 17 Recommendation. Considering the existence of various "white" and "grey spots" in the EU countries with limited ultra-fast broadband coverage, and the fact that its adoption is path-dependent and therefore somewhat sluggish, this assessment might be too optimistic. Therefore, further research on the substitutability between telephony services with more recent data is necessary to evaluate the effects of regulatory changes. As several fixed incumbent carriers have announced a full-IP transition in upcoming years, this matter might be resolved in the near future.
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